INTRODUCTION
Over the past decades, a broad consensus has developed on the need to implement structural reform aimed at improving the overall economic performance of OECD economies. Much has been done, but the depth, scope and timing of reform have differed considerably across countries. These cross-country differences generally reflected two distinct factors. On the one hand, reforms had to be consistent with governments' objectives outside the field of economic efficiency. On the other hand, reform processes have often met political quandaries. These were generated by the difficulty of creating the necessary pro-reform consensus in the electorate and/or overcoming strong opposition by parts of it (even when major non-economic objectives were not directly at stake).
This paper seeks to extend the empirical basis for understanding the political economy influences that may have prompted or hindered consensus around structural reform in product and labour markets. The focus is both on factors that are beyond the control of governments (i.e. that are exogenous to the political process) and on factors over which governments may have some leverage. Assessing empirically the role played by these factors may in turn prove useful in accompanying the process of product and labour market reform in the future.
Because there is neither a well-established model of the political economy of structural reform nor an extensive empirical literature on this topic, the paper adopts a pragmatic empirical strategy. First, the reform experiences of OECD countries are reviewed based on the structural policy indicators that have been developed by the OECD for a large subset of OECD countries. Second, the potential political economy determinants of reform are identified based on the relevant literature. Third, the impact of these potential determinants on the labour and product reforms observed over the past three decades is estimated in the context of a reduced-form estimation approach based on panel data. Finally, main conclusions are drawn.
REFORM PATTERNS
There has been a growing consensus that structural reform is crucial to respond to disappointing growth performances and emerging economic challenges, such as ageing, new technologies and globalisation.
1 Nevertheless, the implementation of structural reform varied widely across countries and across The OECD-wide policy indicators encompass labour and product markets. In each market a number of different policies (and sectors in the case of the product market indicator) are taken into account to measure the extent to which government interventions bear on these markets. The indicator of labour market includes employment protection legislation (EPL), the generosity of unemployment benefit systems (UB), tax wedges on labour income, and implicit tax rates on continuing work at older ages (including early and old-age retirement schemes). It should be noted that a zero score for this indicator does not indicate an optimal organisation of labour market policies. The indicator of product market covers regulations and market conditions, including information on: state control, barriers to entry, involvement in business operations and, in some cases, market structure, in seven non-manufacturing industries: gas, electricity, post, telecommunications, passenger air transport, railways (passenger and freight services) and road freight (Conway and Nicoletti, 2006) .
Figure 1. OECD-wide indicators of labour and product market policies
Cumulative changes 1 from 1975 base year, distribution across countries 1. Negative changes reflect reductions in the degree of rigidities/regulations for both labour and product markets. Negative cumulative changes indicate the intensity of gradual policy reforms over time but do not take into account cross-country differences in initial conditions. 2. The indicator of labour market intervention is measured as a simple average of 4 labour market indicators: employment protection, unemployment benefit systems, implicit tax rates on continued work for older workers and the labour tax wedges. All indicators are normalised ranging from 0 to 1, expressed as per cent of maximum score across OECD countries and over time, where 1 indicates relatively most restrictive labour markets. 3. The product market indicator of regulations is measured as a simple average of regulation in 7 non-manufacturing sectors: Rail, road, airlines, gas, electricity, telecom and post. The indicators are normalised, ranging from 0 to 1, expressed as per cent of maximum score across OECD countries, where 1 reflects relatively most regulated product markets. 14 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 
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© OECD 2006 the sample more generally (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Turkey, Mexico, Luxembourg and Iceland) . For a full set of definitions of the variables used, see the annex to .
Across sectors, liberalisation commenced in road transport -a process mostly completed by around 1990 (Figure 3 ). Reform efforts then moved to the air transport industry, and, from 1995 onwards, to the electricity and telecommunications sectors. In other regulated sectors (natural gas, postal and railway services) reforms have typically been less extensive. The observed sequencing probably reflects that in terms of political economy, liberalising industries with relatively few natural monopoly elements involves costs that are lower and benefits that are more certain than in other sectors. Naturally, this begs the question of why these sectors were regulated in the first place and why there are such cross-country differences in the extent and timing of liberalisation across countries. Later liberalisation in network industries may reflect the subsequent emergence of new technologies (for example as when digitalisation and mobile telephony undermined the existing 
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Per cent 1975-1985 1985-1995 1995-2003 © OECD 2006 natural monopoly of fixed lines) and progress in regulatory techniques (in separating out and focussing regulation on natural monopoly elements within an industry) that tilted the cost-benefit calculations of reforms.
In labour markets, OECD-wide policies became less favourable to employment between the first oil crisis and until the mid-1990s as the crucial parameters of unemployment benefit systems became more generous, tax wedges increased and retirement incentives became stronger (Figure 4 ). Subsequently, there have been some moves to make the overall labour market regulation more employment friendly, mostly reflecting lower tax wedges and some easing of employment protection legislation (EPL), though mostly for temporary contracts (Brandt et al., 2005) . 3 The latter measures mostly have an impact on workers with a weak labour market attachment -a politically less organised group. Few measures aimed at workers with strong labour market attachment have been introduced, aside from sporadic changes in EPL for permanent workers and, more recently, reductions of incentives for early retirement.
In addition, it should be noted that over the past decades a "stylised" sequencing of structural reform has been observed across many OECD countries with i) reforms of trade and foreign direct investment policies and financial markets having generally preceded domestic product market reforms (IMF, 2004) ; and Per cent 1975-1985 1985-1995 1995-2003 
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© OECD 2006 Note: All indicators are normalised ranging from 0 to 1 expressed as per cent of maximum score across OECD countries, where 1 indicates relatively most restrictive labour market policies. Definitions of individual labour market indicators can be found in the annex to Høj et al. ( ). 1975 Høj et al. ( -1985 Høj et al. ( 1985 Høj et al. ( -1995 Høj et al. ( 1995 Høj et al. ( -2003 A Unemployment benefit replacement rate Note: All indicators are normalised ranging from 0 to 1 expressed as per cent of maximum score across OECD countries, where 1 indicates relatively most restrictive labour market policies. Definitions of individual labour market indicators can be found in the annex to Høj et al. ( ). 1975 Høj et al. ( -1985 Høj et al. ( 1985 Høj et al. ( -1995 Høj et al. ( 1995 Høj et al. ( -2003 A
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ii) product market reforms having generally preceded labour market reforms (Brandt et al., 2005) .
FACTORS SLOWING STRUCTURAL REFORM
The observed reform patterns reflect, in part, substantial resistance to reforms. Over and above the intrinsic value that existing structural policies may have for the individuals or groups concerned, this resistance can be ascribed to the following main factors: 4
• The uncertainty surrounding the benefits of reforms is often larger than the uncertainty surrounding their costs, even when the expected aggregate gains are substantially larger than the expected collective losses (Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991) .
• The costs of implementing structural reform tend to be upfront, while the associated benefits take time to materialise. Therefore, politicians (particularly with short time horizons) are hesitant in implementing reforms as there is a risk that the electorate will only experience the costs of reforms during the legislature.
5
• Some regulations tend to create rents, which are shared among the beneficiaries of regulation in many ways. 6 Generating consensus for reforms suffers from the "collective action" problem that the costs of reforms are concentrated on relatively small and well-organised target groups, while the benefits tend to be thinly spread -at times to such a degree that the beneficiaries have difficulties in observing them -over a much larger and less organised electorate (Olson, 1965) .
FACTORS AFFECTING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF STRUCTURAL REFORM
From a theoretical point of view, there is a wide range of factors that might influence the implementation of structural reform. A number of these are discussed below before empirically testing their influence in the subsequent section.
Initial structural conditions
Initial conditions determine the scope for structural reform to enhance economic performance and when this is wide, pressure and desire to undertake reform might be thought to be greater. 7 On the other hand, a wide gap probably also strengthens the resolve of rent seeking beneficiaries of regulation to maintain the status quo (by for example forming coalitions to block reforms). In the product and labour market areas, it would appear that prior to 1995 there was little systematic link between initial conditions and reform progress, but that afterwards there has been a catching up effect, resulting in a convergence of policies across © OECD 2006 OECD countries, although the convergence in labour market policies is partly the result of some countries tightening their policy stance (Figure 5, Panels A and B) . In an econometric investigation, IMF (2004) partially confirms the above, finding that initial conditions hardly affect labour market reforms while significantly affecting product market reforms
Macroeconomic conditions
Economic crises can promote reforms because bad economic conditions make it clearer that existing policies are no longer sustainable. For instance, crises have often been associated with major macroeconomic policy changes -in particular when public budget positions were on unsustainable paths (OECD, 1988) . This is because crises introduce a degree of urgency in the decision-making process, weaken opposition to reform, and raise the cost associated with pre-reform institutional arrangements (Drazen, 2000, and Drazen and Easterly, 2001) . 8 On the other hand, the political opposition to, for example, labour market reform during economic downswings may be relatively strong as the higher unemployment risk raises consensus for more generous income support and increases workers' attachment to job protection (Bean, 1998) . Reforms during times of crises can then be seen as imposing adjustment costs on workers already suffering from adverse economic conditions. Moreover, it may also be argued that opposition to reforms is likely to be weaker during economic upswings as the costs of reforms are relatively small (with unemployment risks declining and job opportunities increasing) and with the distributional effects being less visible when aggregate incomes are growing (Pitlik and Wirth, 2003) . 9 Despite the conflicting arguments, the few empirical studies that have examined the link between crisis and market-oriented reforms confirm that poor economic performance, if not outright economic crisis, tends to induce structural reform (IMF, 2004; Duval and Elmeskov, 2005; Pitlik and Wirth, 2003) .
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Macroeconomic policies
The implementation of structural reform may be affected by fiscal policy insofar as measures to compensate the losers of reform or to accommodate any temporary effects on aggregate demand relative to supply need to be financed (see below). This suggests that a poor fiscal position may hamper the implementation of structural reform. At the same time, budgetary pressures may increase the urgency of undertaking certain labour market reforms so as to restore fiscal soundness (Saint Paul, 2002) . Conversely, if the initial budget position is sound, reforms that are expected to increase the economy's structural rate of employment may create room for compensating or accommodating fiscal measures by improving the cyclically-adjusted budget balance. On the other hand, the process 1 1. The product market indicator of regulation in 7 non-manufacturing sectors: rail, road, airlines, gas, electricity, telecom and post. The indicators are normalised, ranging from 0 to 1, expressed as per cent of maximum score across OECD countries, where 1 reflects relatively most regulated product markets. of fiscal consolidation may in itself exhaust the political capital available for introducing other reforms (Duval and Elmeskov, 2005) .
Monetary policy may play a role in the promotion of structural reform. A number of the countries that have successfully implemented broad-based structural reform, such as New Zealand, Sweden and the United Kingdom, also introduced a domestic anchor for monetary policy, such as having independent central banks to pursue price stability objectives, hence ensuring an endogenous response to any deflationary effects of structural reform (Saint-Paul, 2002) .
Using external anchors, such as targeting a fixed exchange rate, may also be conducive to structural reform. This is because the latter may be seen to reduce interest rate differentials vis-à-vis the anchor currency and is needed to increase the resilience of the economy in the face of external shocks that cannot be accommodated by monetary policy (this is often presented as the TINA -There Is No Alternative -argument). At the same time, exchange rate targeting also lessens the scope for accommodating the adjustment costs implied by reforms through easier monetary policies, thereby making reforms politically more difficult. Indeed, empirical studies have found little support for the TINA hypothesis (Nicoletti et al., 2001; Duval and Elmeskov, 2005) .
A special case of an external anchor is the introduction of a common currency (such as the Euro). In this case, the TINA argument is further weakened as interest rate differentials are largely removed with the disappearance of the devaluation risk. In addition, unilaterally implemented structural reform with deflationary effects increases the reforming country's real interest rate, implying higher transition costs to the new labour and product market equilibria (Saint-Paul and Bentolila, 2000) . 11, 12 On the other hand, a common currency also implies that the cost of accommodating labour market problems that are perceived as being driven by short-term factors merely through fiscal measures is reduced. Indeed, empirical studies tend to suggest that the introduction of the Euro may actually have slowed down the reform process (Belke et al., 2005) .
Political institutions
Institutional features of the political decision-making process may be important for the ability to implement structural reform. 13 Presidential political systems and majoritarian electoral rules often seem to empower large and homogeneous constituencies as compared with the outcomes in parliamentarian systems and under proportional electoral rules (Persson, 2003) . Thus, they should in principle be better at overcoming the resistance of relatively small interest groups to structural reform.
The political orientation of the government is perceived to determine the government's position regarding the trade-off between equity and efficiency with for example left-of-centre governments being perceived to give a greater weight © OECD 2006 to equity. This could play a role for labour market reforms, while political orientation probably plays a smaller role for reforms in product markets as the involved interest groups tend to be spread across the electorate of many parties . The political relevance of the equity-efficiency trade-off could also hinge on the initial level of income inequality (Box 2).
The government's tenure of office may also affect the reform process.
14 If a general election is approaching, the government may refrain from implementing structural reform with high short-term costs. On the other hand, newly-elected Box 2. Income inequality and structural policies
In principle, the degree of income inequality in an economy can be a factor promoting or hindering reform. For example, it might be argued that in countries with a high degree of income inequality, there should be more support for policies that induce redistribution from high-to low-income households than in more equal societies as the median voter would be a low-to-medium income individual, and would thus gain from such policies (Meltzer and Richard, 1981; Austen-Smith, 2000; Krusell and Rios Rull, 1999; Lindert, 1996; and Perotti, 1996) . Hence, depending on how a given reform is perceived as affecting income distribution its support may differ as between more or less equal societies.
Income inequality may be a particularly important determinant of labour market policies (Wright, 1986; Saint Paul, 1996 and . For example, risk-averse individuals in societies with unequal earnings would likely prefer to be insured against labour market risk through a redistributive unemployment benefit system rather than through strict EPL. Similar reasoning suggests that configurations with strict EPL and low unemployment benefits should emerge in presence of compressed wage structures (Boeri et al., 2004) .
Income inequality considerations may play a lesser role in the political determination of product market reform, which tend to spread the likely benefits throughout the economy, but with a tendency to concentrate the costs of reform on relatively few and easily identifiable actors . Also in other areas, where there are no obvious income redistribution effects, inequality considerations may be an important political economy factor. For example, income inequality can generate support for increased pension spending, as more people will benefit from the degree of intragenerational redistribution displayed by several pension systems (Tabellini, 2000; and Galasso and Profeta, 2002) . Similarly, there is evidence that early retirement is more frequent among low-and middle-income individuals than among high-income workers, indicating that the political constituency in favour of early retirement schemes should be larger in societies with more income inequality (Gruber and Wise, 1999; Blöndal and Scarpetta, 1998; .
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governments should be more prone to implement reforms whose expected gains during the legislature are substantial. However, this argument relates mostly to the moment when governments initiate the reform process. Taking into account political and administrative obstacles, it is likely that there is a considerable time lag between the beginning of the reform process and the actual implementation of reforms. This may help to explain why empirical work in this area tends to be inconclusive (Pitlik and Wirth, 2003) .
International influences
Domestic reforms may be affected by international influences in a variety of ways: through competitive pressures, peer pressures and imitation, and binding agreements or treaties. Competitive pressures from openness to trade and FDI strengthen incentives for domestic firms to seek the reform of policies in labour and product markets that put them at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis foreign suppliers.
15 For instance, firms that intensively use inputs from sheltered sectors or suffer from high labour costs may be more vocal in pushing for product and labour market reforms (Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2003; Pitlik and Wirth, 2003) . 16 On the other hand, resistance to greater openness is likely to increase among lowskilled workers with low job-to-job transition probability in exposed industries. At the same time, other workers may be in favour of such as reforms through their beneficial effects on real incomes.
Another way in which competitive pressures from openness can influence reforms is through "trickle down" effects of reforms in one area on another. For instance, manufacturing trade integration may have stimulated reforms in the transport sector (e.g. road freight and air transport) within the European Union and there is evidence that opening up international financial markets has helped creating a worldwide constituency for telecommunications reform by enhancing the demand for a cheap and efficient flow of information (Li et al., 2001) . Such effects are likely to be stronger among main trading partners, because of factors like peer pressures and comparisons/benchmarking of structural policy frameworks and performance.
Product market reforms may also be induced by supranational constraints imposed by international agreements or treaties, such as with the European Union (EU). The latter has been instrumental in strengthening domestic competition (especially in the service sector) or creating domestic institutions that stimulate reform (e.g. antitrust or sectoral regulatory authorities) and the implementation of the EU Single Market Programme has pursued the removal of remaining barriers to trade and FDI (often resulting in the elimination or reduction of subsidies or protection). Other international treaties are more focussed on trade issues, such as NAFTA and WTO. As these treaties expose domestic markets to international competition, their effects on reforms are similar to those discussed in the previous paragraph.
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Demographic factors
Given the importance of coalitions, there is an empirical issue whether reforms are easier in smaller countries with homogenous populations than in larger heterogeneous countries, although empirical investigations of this issue have been very limited (Alesina et al., 2003) .
The age structure of the population may also affect reform attitudes. Older population segments may discount future uncertain benefits of reforms more heavily than younger segments. On the other hand old-age workers and retirees have a vested interest in growth-enhancing structural reform to secure the financial viability of pension and social security systems. Such reforms also boost their real incomes and the return on their capital holdings. Empirical evidence is sparse with for example Heinemann (2004) finding that ageing of a society lowers the probability of (large) reforms.
The influence of new technologies
Technical progress has historically been a powerful disruptive force in product markets by undermining existing natural monopolies inter alia through a reduction of scale economies, capacity constraints and sunk costs. The resulting lowering of entry barriers and development of new products tends to increase the political leverage of potential new entrants and reduce consumer concerns as to the outcomes of reforms, leading to a strengthening of the pro-reform constituency.
17 New technologies may also change firms' perception of costs and benefits of existing structural polices, with for example the emergence of new information and communication technologies (ICT) leading to a more uncertain technological paradigm and thus increasing the costs of regulations reducing the mobility of capital and labour. Indeed, ICT is a prominent example of disruptive technical progress, with a particularly strong impact on telecommunications. It initially enabled cheap international call-back services that unsettled the system of administratively-determined accounting rates for settling international communications and subsequently introduced competition from mobile telephones.
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Reform sequencing and interactions
From a political economy perspective, the optimal design of reform strategies depends on the extent to which various institutions and policies are complementary in the sense that the existence of one of them increases the political support for another (Saint-Paul, 2000) . If these complementarities were known, constituencies for reforms could in principle be established by appropriately combining and sequencing reforms. However, in practice the sequencing of and interaction among reforms tend to differ from country to country -at least to some extent -© OECD 2006 depending on economic and social institutions and traditions, and reflecting specific political economy factors.
Reflecting the difficulties of implementing labour market reforms, the OECD countries that have reformed their labour markets have done so by pursuing a range of strategies to overcome opposition (OECD, 2006) . For example, the United Kingdom and New Zealand followed a "confrontation" strategy of weakening incumbent workers' bargaining power (for example by making strike ballots mandatory and curbing secondary industrial action), while the Netherlands and, at least initially, Australia, Denmark and Ireland used an "inclusion" approach based on extending existing labour relations so as to internalise to a greater extent outsider interests into insiders' behaviour (Elmeskov et al., 1998, Blanchard and Philippon, 2004 ).
Another strategy is based on sequencing, where a number of governments have introduced reforms that mostly target workers with a weak labour market attachment (e.g. the unemployed or workers with precarious jobs) and, at least initially, leave regular workers (e.g. with indefinite contracts) virtually untouched. Such measures tend to reinforce labour market duality, but may as well build up public support for subsequent reforms aimed at the core labour market policies and institutions. For example, Spain reformed EPL for workers with temporary contracts in the mid-1980s, which led to most new hiring being based on temporary contracts (OECD, 2006) . The resulting substantial increase in the share of workers with temporary contracts, and the associated concerns about fairness in the labour market, subsequently generated pressures for easing EPL for workers on permanent contracts.
Incumbent workers' sentiments towards reform may be affected by structural reform in other areas. For example, a positive relationship between the stringency of employment protection and the degree of bargaining corporatism can be observed across OECD countries, perhaps indicating that, by increasing job turnover, decentralised bargaining regimes reduce the incentives for maintaining a high degree of employment protection. On the other hand, there is arguably a substitutability between employment protection and unemployment benefit schemes, indicating that effective income support systems can compensate for a laxer EPL regime (Buti and Sapir, 1998; Boeri et al., 2003; Sapir, 2005) .
Sequencing strategies can also be found in product markets, where there is some evidence that reforms are relatively easier and more successfully implemented in sectors producing intermediate inputs to other industries (having a potential relatively wide pro-reform constituency) as compared with sectors mostly producing final consumption goods (where reforms may be hampered by consumer concerns about quality and distributional effects) (Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991; Castanheira et al., 2006) . This suggests a sequence of product market © OECD 2006 reforms (as observed in practice) coping first with producers of intermediate inputs (e.g. freight transport) before moving to reforms that affect final consumer products (e.g. passenger transport).
There are also potential interaction and sequencing effects across markets. For instance, regulations in product and labour markets are closely related (Nicoletti et al., 1999; Conway et al., 2005) with some evidence that product market liberalisation has often preceded labour market reforms (Brandt et al., 2005) (Figure 6 ). There are a number of channels that may underlie these phenomena (Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2005) . Pro-competitive product market reforms reduce market power, stimulate new entry and reduce consumer prices. This leads to an expansion of activity and labour demand, which may weaken opposition to reform as both employment opportunities and average real wages increase (Ebell and Haefke, 2003; Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2003; Spector, 2003) . 19 More specifically, product market reforms may improve the conditions for achieving an easing of EPL rules as product market reforms boost overall employment opportunities, thereby reducing the incentives for incumbent workers to protect their jobs through strict EPL rules (Koeniger and Vindigni, 2003) . Moreover, product market reforms also increase the marginal employment gains that can be expected from less strict EPL (Kugler and Pica, 2004) . As well, the compressing of rents may gradually reduce the support for labour market institutions aimed at capturing these rents (Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2003) .
There is some evidence that public ownership tends to hamper other reform efforts (Figure 7 ), reflecting among other reasons the conflict between the government's regulatory role and its role as a market participant. 20 However, privatisation is often opposed by employees as well as management, requiring a sequence of reform and compensatory measures (Box 3).
Compensation strategies
While one of the main objectives of reform is to improve overall economic efficiency, existing legal rights may be affected and rents will be reduced or eliminated in the process. Thus, governments may want to overcome reform resistance by compensating losses that are temporary or circumscribed. In practice, however, compensating transfers are hard to implement because the target groups themselves are often difficult to identify, particularly in the labour market. In product markets the target groups may be more easily identified, such as in the case of privatisation (Box 3). Compensation strategies can also rely on combining different policy measures. An example is to combine measures to increase job-search activities with expansion of the safety net for the unemployed. 21 Another possibility is to ease EPL and at the same time improve income support schemes for job-to-job transitions, whereby workers are compensated for a higher risk of becoming unemployed (even if for a shorter period) with a smaller income reduction if the risk materialises. For example, a number of OECD countries, notably Denmark, have maintained the generosity of unemployment benefit systems (although duration has been shortened) but have expanded activation measures and tightened availability criteria.
Box 3. The effects of public-owned companies' organisation on the liberalisation process
The speed and scope of market liberalization of sectors dominated by publicowned companies have been affected by cross-country differences in these companies' industrial relations arrangements, ownership structures, legal status and stock market listings. A particular challenge in a number of cases has been to induce employees and management to favour privatisation. The latter group tends to become part of the pro-reform constituency once the firm has been incorporated and the market liberalised because of the need to maintain market positions (for example through mergers). On the other hand, employees sometimes have relatively favourable employment conditions, requiring compensatory packages to overcome resistance. For instance, Castanheira et al., (2006) note that both Italy and France started out with public-owned monopolies in the energy and telecommunications sectors. However, from the outset industrial relationships in Italy for public-owned companies generally resembled those in the private sector, while those in France were typically based on more favourable public law contracts and had special retirement schemes. The Italian sequencing of reforms made liberalisation relatively smooth, moving from corporatisation to liberalisation and privatisation without facing significant resistance from employees and only offering relatively little compensation to them. In contrast, reform attempts in France have been met by fierce resistance, leading to a hesitant reform process and the introduction of complicated compensatory packages, mostly based on "grand-fathering rights" for existing employees, including disembodying the pensions of incumbents from the private companies, with full guarantees by the state (Høj and Wise, 2006) . Similar pension arrangements were put in place for incumbent employees of Deutsche Telecom in Germany, although prior to liberalisation, to avoid significant resistance. In a similar vein, British coal miners were offered redundancy packages that included mobility allowances and expanded possibilities for early retirement when the public-owned coal company closed pits during the 1980s.
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ECONOMETRIC TESTING OF POLITICAL ECONOMY FACTORS FOR DOMESTIC STRUCTURAL REFORM
In the absence of a "structural" political economy model of reforms, reducedform specifications have been estimated to explore the influence of several of the political economy factors described in previous sections on OECD indicators of structural policies. 22 Three sets of regressions were performed, corresponding to different levels of aggregation of the dependent variables:
• The first set of regressions looks at the political economy determinants of changes in synthetic indicators for overall structural policies (covering both the labour and product markets). All aggregations were performed using equal weights for the underlying policy indicators. An alternative aggregation for the overall indicator of structural policies, giving a two-thirds weight to the labour market area and a one-third weight to the product market area, was carried out, but yielded qualitatively similar results.
• The second set of regressions focuses on synthetic indicators of, respectively, overall labour market policies and overall product market policies.
• The third set of regressions looks at the determinants of changes in individual labour market indicators covering specific policy areas (EPL, tax wedges on labour income, unemployment benefit generosity and implicit taxation of continuing work at older ages), and in individual product market indicators covering regulatory policies at the industry level (for the seven non-manufacturing sectors for which time-series of indicators are available).
The (annual) dataset of indicators of labour and product market policies covers 21 OECD countries over the 1975-2003 period (1985-2003 for the labour market). The regressions generally use a common set of explanatory variables capturing potential political economy influences on structural reform. However, as regressions move from the aggregate to the detailed policy (or industry) level, this set is enlarged to include policy interactions (e.g. among different labour market policies or between product and labour market policies).
By aggregating indicators for specific policy areas or industries (which tend to follow different time paths), the first two sets of regressions ensure that sufficient time variation is available in the dependent variable. However, it should be noted that this comes at the expense of a potential aggregation bias in the estimated coefficients. Estimates at the level of individual policy areas or industries are less prone to aggregation bias, but results may be sensitive to the extent of time variation in policies.
Econometric strategy and issues
The econometric analysis uses as dependent variables the annual variation in the above policy indicators. In general, the policy indicators for specific labour © OECD 2006 
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© OECD 2006 market areas (and some industries) have a relatively low variability in the time dimension, implying that some caution is warranted in the interpretation of the results for such policies (Table 1) .
The explanatory variables used in the empirical analysis were divided in seven groups, comprising: macroeconomic conditions; macroeconomic policies; political factors; international influences; demography; interactions with policies in other areas; and industrial relations. A detailed explanation of the variables included in regressions and the interpretation of their coefficient estimates is provided in Table 2 . Some additional variables were included in the initial econometric analysis, but later dropped for a persistent lack of statistical significance. These additional explanatory variables covered a small country effect and features of the political systems (such as size of majority, electoral systems, and government fractionalisation). Moreover, a number of terms aimed at capturing interactions between initial macroeconomic conditions (e.g. interacting the lagged level of the dependent variable with a proxy for big crisis, long-term unemployment or EU membership) were tried, but without success.
A preliminary issue in the empirical analysis of the political economy of structural reform is how to identify such reforms. Typically, radical reforms are characterized by sudden, large changes in the indicators, while more gradual reform processes would be reflected as moderate but continuous variations. Previous work by Duval and Elmeskov (2005) concentrated on radical aggregate reforms by constructing a binary reform index and investigated which economic and policy factors may trigger these large reform episodes by using non-linear (probit) models of qualitative choice.
23 By contrast, the econometric analysis in this paper aims at examining all reforms, as measured by any variation in indicators of labour and Ditto.
Labour market policy indicator
The average of indicators of strictness of EPL, tax wedges, implicit tax rates on continued work for 55-59 and 60-64 years, and generousity of the UB system.
Ditto.
B. Explanatory variables
Initial structural conditions
Lagged dependent variable A negative and significant coefficient signals a convergence process towards a country-specific level, which is determined by the country's economic and political environment.
… interacted with other explanatory variables
The product of the lagged dependent variable and an explanatory variable.
A negative and significant coefficient indicates that the converngence is reinforced by the explanatory variable, implying a faster convergence process for countries with a high value of the dependent variable.
Public ownership
Average of public ownership in the seven non-manufacturing industries covered by the product market policy indicator.
A positive and significant coefficient indicates that public ownership hinders structural reform.
Macroeconomic variables
Unemployment rate Share of unemployed over the labour force, national account definitions.
A negative and significant coefficient signals that higher unemployment induces reforms.
Long-term unemployment
Share of unemployed that have been unemployed more than 1 year.
A negative and significant coefficient signals that a stronger incidence of long-term unemployment induces reforms.
Large increase in unemployment
Dummy for when the unemployment rate increases by more than two times its standard deviation in the overall sample .
A negative and significant coefficient indicates that unusually large increases in unemployed leads to reform.
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… interacted with lagged dependent variable
A negative and signficant coefficient indicates that unusual large increases in unemployment lead to faster convergence of reforms for countries with a high value of the dependent variable. Big economic crisis(-1, -2, -3 ) Dummies for when the output gap is larger than -4% (at different lags).
A negative and significant sum of coefficients on the three lags shows that the long-run effect of an unusual large output gap is to reform.
Macroeconomic policies
General government net lending
The annual financing needs of the general government.
A negative and significant coefficient signals that an increase in net lending leads to structural reforms.
Change in cyclically adjusted primary surplus
Measures changes in the general government's structural budget deficit (excluding interest payments).
A positive and significant coefficient signals that an acceleration of fiscal consolidation in the past slows down the implementation of structural reforms.
Fixed exchange rate policy
Dummy for pursuing a fixed exchange rate policy.
A negative and significant coefficient signals that pursuing this policy leads to structural reforms.
Political institutions
Ideology, left-of-center government Dummy for when the political orientation of the government is left-of-centre.
A positive and significant coefficient signals reduced reform efforts.
Mature government
Dummy for when the government has been in office for more than two years.
A negative and significant coefficient suggests that mature governments implement reforms.
International influences
Structural policy indicator in main trading partners 
Interaction with regulations in other policy areas
Financial market policy indicator
A composite index including credit controls, interest rate controls, and restrictions on international transactions.
A positive and significant coefficient suggests that financial market reforms induce reforms in labour and product markets.
International tariff barriers
Ratio of customs and import duties to the value of imports.
A positive and significant coefficient suggest that trade liberalisation is conducive to domestic reforms.
Product market indicator
As above. A positive and significant coefficient indicates that product market liberalisation induces labour market reforms.
Interactions with other labour market institutions
EPL for temporary workers Measuring the strictness of EPL for workers with fixed-term contracts.
A positive and significant coefficient indicates that a reform in the explanatory policy variable induce reforms in dependent policy variable.
EPL for regular workers
Measuring the strictness of EPL for workers with indefinite contracts.
UB replacement benefit for low income workers
The first year UB replacement rate for workers earning 66 per cent of an average production worker's (APW) income.
UB generosity for long-term unemployed
The replacement rate after 4/5 years of unemployment relative to the replacement rate for first year unemployed.
A positive and significant coefficient indicates that a reform in the explanatory policy variable induce reforms in dependent policy variable. Tax wedge on labour income The share of personal income tax and all social security contributions (net of social benefits) to total labour cost for two family types (single and a couple with dependent spouse and two children with an income equal to 100 of APW earning).
Implicit tax rate on continued work for 55-59 years and 60-64 years
The weighted average of implicit tax rates on continued work for 55 and 59 years relative to early retirement and for 60 and 64 years relative to early retirement and old age pension scheme.
A positive and significant coefficient indicates that a reform in the explanatory policy variable induce reforms in dependent policy variable. product market policies. Hence, it is based on a linear specification, which also allows testing for policy convergence, by introducing the lagged level of the policy indicator among the explanatory variables in the regression equations.
Model to be estimated
The linear econometric model relates the annual variation in a policy indicator (Y) to the lagged level of the policy indicator and to a set of logged explanatory variables (X) according to the following equation:
, where i is a country index, t is a time index, υ i is a fixed country effect and ε is a random error.
In this model a negative parameter α identifies policy convergence towards some (possibly country-specific) level. Specific assumptions on the error term, on the included explanatory variables and on the country fixed effect will depend on the econometric specification used. Note that the specification with the change in the policy indicator regressed on its own lagged level and the lagged value of the other explanatory variable is similar to standard growth regressions.
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In selecting the political economy variables (X j ) to be included in the preferred specification of the above model, a general-to-specific estimation strategy was followed. Initially, a model which included all potentially relevant political economy factors (capturing all different factors identified in the previous section) was estimated. In this general model, the sample size was limited by the existence of missing observations for some of the explanatory variables. Subsequently, statistically insignificant variables were omitted to reach a more parsimonious model specification. This model was initially tested on the same
Industrial relations
Indicator of corporatism Degree of wage centralisation weighted by the prevalence of automatic extensions of wage contracts.
A negative and significant coefficient suggests that higher degrees of corporatism is conducive to reforms.
Union density
Union coverage by individual membership.
A negative and significant coefficient implies that higher union density stimulates reform efforts.
Strikes
Strike days per 1000 workers. A positive and significant coefficient signfies that increased strike activity hampers reforms. 
sample used for the general specification and subsequently on a larger sample, using all the data available for the included explanatory variables. Results were generally robust to changes in the sample size and the results reported below are based on the larger sample.
Three alternative specifications -pooled OLS, fixed effects OLS and system GMM -have been used in order to deal with some of the econometric issues that emerged, such as dynamic bias, persistence of the dependent variable, unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity problems, and to test for robustness of the results. All models are estimated accounting for heteroskedasticity by using White robust standard errors.
For all estimations, the initial econometric analysis featured a pooled OLS regression with no fixed effects, which exploits the variation in the policy indicator both across countries and over time. This regression model provides correlations between the variables of interest, but may lead to biased coefficient estimates due to unobservable heterogeneity. For instance, in the presence of unobservable country specific effects (such as country specific institutions or policies) results may be inaccurate, as the impact of the time-invariant country-specific features may be wrongly attributed to other determinants.
Thus, in a second step, unobserved cross-country heterogeneity is accounted for by using a dynamic fixed effects specification. This fixed effect OLS regression concentrates on the within country -hence, over time -variation of each policy indicator. The significance of these fixed effects is then tested. In general, the F-tests reported in the annex to indicate that fixed effects are significant in almost all regressions, the exceptions being in the estimations for EPL and the telecommunications sector. However, in the presence of significant country fixed effects the coefficients estimated with the dynamic fixed effects specification may still be biased. This is due to the potential endogeneity among the dependent and explanatory variables and to the existence of a lagged dependent variable in the regression, which leads to a (so-called Nickell) bias in the estimates of the convergence coefficient, α, and possibly of the other coefficients, β j , (Nickell, 1981; Wooldridge, 2002) . The latter effect may not be too worrisome, since the magnitude of the bias decreases as the time series dimension of the panel increases, and as the time series dimension has (roughly) the same order of magnitude as the country dimension (Judson and Owen, 1999) .
To account for these partial sources of bias, the last econometric specification consists of a system-GMM approach (Blundell and Bond, 1998) . This approach instruments the explanatory variables with their lagged differences as well as with their lagged levels. The system-GMM technique has been specifically developed for the estimation of dynamic panel data equations with persistent dependent variables and potentially endogenous explanatory variables (Bond, © OECD 2006 Arellano, 2003; and Bond et al., 2001) . Using system-GMM in the context of the political economy regressions seems appropriate as most policy indicators used in the present work display a strong degree of persistence and endogeneity of some explanatory variables is likely. In specifying the system-GMM regressions, all lagged policy and macroeconomic conditions variables are assumed to be endogenous, whereas institutional variables (such as EU membership or political factors) are treated as exogenous. As for the previous econometric specification, however, the main drawbacks emerge in the case of a small time dimension, when the number of instruments may grow too large with respect to the available observations. To minimise this problem, the longest possible time series were used when possible.
Two standard specification tests are used to check the validity of the system-GMM regressions: the Hansen tests of over-identifying restrictions and the Arellano-Bond tests of lack of serial correlation. The former suggest that the choice of instruments is appropriate, since the hypothesis of valid moment conditions is never rejected.
25, 26 The Arellano-Bond test almost always rejects the hypothesis of no first-order correlation, while accepting -as expected -the hypothesis of no second-order correlation. However, in some cases, the hypothesis of no second order correlation was rejected, which calls for some caution in interpreting the results of the regressions for unemployment benefits in the labour market and for the telecommunications sector in the product market.
The econometric results
To make the results more accessible, they are presented in synoptic tables (Table 2-4) showing, for each policy variable, the sign and significance of the estimated coefficients for each of the estimation methods used and for both the general and parsimonious versions of the models. Little information is lost by not showing the size of coefficients in these tables because, in the absence of an underlying structural model and given the large use of indicators (whose scale is necessarily arbitrary), the size of the estimated coefficients would be difficult to interpret. 27 Detailed regression results can be found in . The OLS specification is generally rejected in sectoral regressions for product market policies (except in telecommunications) but cannot be rejected in some of the estimates for the specific labour market policies (in all employment protection legislation regressions and in unemployment benefit generosity). The estimated coefficient, α, is almost always significant and negative -thus indicating policy convergence in almost all labour market programmes and industry-level policies (except the air and railway sectors). Interestingly, the System-GMM and OLS estimates tend to be similar, but both differ -often significantly -from the dynamic fixed effects estimates.
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A similar pattern was also found for estimates of the coefficients of the other explanatory variables, β j , across different estimators. Thus, the Nickel bias in the fixed effect estimates would appear to be substantial. Overall, estimations of the parsimonious model specifications using the largest possible sample largely confirmed the results obtained on the smaller sample used for the general model specifications. However, in a number of cases, previously significant variables lost their significance showing a lack of robustness in moving to a longer time period. These estimates were hence not reported in the tables discussed in the main text.
It should also be noted that only variables that passed preliminary statistical investigation are presented. A number of other variables were tested, but were excluded from the full empirical investigation because of a lack of statistical relevance. Among these were: the effects of majoritarian and presidential versus proportional election systems; the size of parliamentarian majority; small country effects; the degree of openness to foreign trade and investments; investments in information and communication technology as a proxy of technological changes; and the structural unemployment rate. Furthermore, considerable effort was put into testing relationships between different policies, but besides those reported below none were supported by the data.
Discussion of empirical results
In interpreting the econometric results, it is important to keep in mind that all structural policy indicators are increasing in the restrictiveness of policies; hence, the dependent variables decrease with reform effort. A number of political economy factors were found to have a significant and robust effect on structural reform across regression estimates. Each of them is discussed below, dealing first with their effects on the overall policy indicator (Table 3) and turning next to their effects on specific policy areas (Table 4) or industries (Table 5 ) when these provide additional qualifications or insights. The following discussion is generally based on coefficients that are significant and robust across estimation methods. In ambiguous cases, estimates stemming from the system GMM approach were privileged.
Convergence in policies
In regressions for the aggregate policy indicators, the coefficient on the lagged level of the dependent variable is generally negative and significant but close to zero (see , reflecting high persistence of policies over time. Thus, the process of (conditional) convergence in structural policies is very slow. For most specific and industry-level policies, there is also evidence of slow convergence, although some differences emerge:
• In the labour market area, evidence of convergence is weakest in EPL for regular workers, generosity for long-term unemployed and tax wedges. 
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Political institutions
Ideology, left-of-center government + + + + + + . + . + . + . . . Mature government (more than 2 years in office)
. . . 
------------
International influences
Demography
Old age dependency ratio (-1) . . . . . .
------
Interactions with policies in other areas
Product market policy indicator (-1) + + + + + + Public ownership (-1) 6 . + . + + .
Industrial relations
Indicator of corporatism (-1 • In the product market area, the weakest evidence is found in the gas industry, in postal services and in rail transport.
Macroeconomic conditions
The estimated coefficients of the variables for big economic crises are negative and significant throughout estimation methods for the change in the overall product market indicator, indicating that such crises are associated with higher reform activity, while insignificant coefficients for the overall labour market indicator suggest no such effect in OECD labour markets. The significant effects on the overall structural policy indicator seem to be driven by the results for product markets. These results are only partially confirmed for individual policies:
• In the labour market area, crises tend to reduce the relative generosity of unemployment benefits for the long-term unemployed, perhaps reflecting stepped up efforts to eliminate "unemployment traps".
• In product markets, the result that crises appear to stimulate reforms is confirmed in air transport and postal services, while in other sectors they have either no or opposite effects on reform activity (e.g. in gas and rail).
No robust effects of unemployment are found on any of the aggregate indicators. However, there is some weak evidence that unusually large increases in unemployment lead to more labour market reform when these policies are very interventionist, as suggested by the significant and negative coefficient on the interaction term. The lack of results at the aggregate level is likely to be the result of contradictory effects for individual labour market policies:
• There is some evidence that a higher unemployment rate leads to easier EPL for regular workers. There is also some evidence that a larger incidence Table 3 . Political economy determinants of changes in aggregate policy indicators (cont.) All policy indicators are increasing in restrictions Legend: O: OLS; F: Fixed effect; G: system GMM . = non significant; +/-= significant at 10% level; +/-= significant at 5% level. 1. The aggregate structural policy indicator is a summary indicator of both OECD wide product and labour market indicators using equal weights. The aggregate indicator is normalised and values close to 0 indicates least regulated markets. 2. The product market regulation indicator is defined excluding public ownership. 3. The big crisis variable was tested for three lagged periods. The reported coefficients summarise statistics for the long-run effects. 4. The weighted average (using the relative trade weights) of the level of the dependent variable in the three main trading partners. 5. Single market dummy interacted with the lagged level of the dependent variable. 6. Average public ownership in the seven non-manufacturing sectors reported in table 4. 7. A summary measure of degree of bargaining centralisation and co-ordination. Source: OECD Secretariat's calculations. General Specific General Specific General Specific General Specific Big economic crisis (-1, -2, -3 
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O F G O F G O F G O F G O F G O F G O F G O F G Initial structural conditions Lagged dependent variable (-1) . -. ---. ---. --------. ---- Macroeconomic conditions Unemployment rate (-1) . . . ---. . -. . . + . .
Interaction with policies in other areas
Product of long-term unemployment is associated with easier EPL for temporary workers and lower tax wedges.
• However, there is also evidence that unusually high increases in unemployment rates are associated with increased employment protection (even though this effect is dampened when legislation is already relatively strict) and relatively more generous unemployment benefits for the long-term unemployed (the latter is also triggered by higher long-term unemployment).
• There is some evidence that higher unemployment tends to go along with a lower implicit tax rate on continuing work at older ages, inducing older workers to remain employed. This is somewhat surprising given the "lump of labour" fallacy that characterised policies towards older workers in many OECD countries.
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• Finally, higher unemployment rates are associated with higher tax wedges.
Comparing the results for big economic crises and unemployment suggests a political cycle in which incomes for the long-term unemployed are secured in bad times (such as when there are unusually large increases in unemployment), but the benefit system is reformed when the sense of urgency (i.e. during big economic crises) becomes widespread among the electorate.
International influences
The effects of international influences (reforms in trading partners, liberalisation of trade flows, EU membership, EU Single Market Programme) were found to be robust and significant in some of the regressions for the aggregate reform indicators. Such influences are generally associated with stepped up liberalisations in Table 4 . Political economy determinants of changes in indicators of specific labour market policies (cont.)
All policy indicators are increasing in restrictions Legend: O: OLS; F: Fixed effect; G: system GMM . = non significant; +/-= significant at 10% level; +/-= significant at 5% level. Note: Negative signs for estimated coefficients indicate positive effects of the variable on implementing the explained reforms. However, for regulatory policy variables (such as trade, finance, product and labour markets) their coefficients should be positively signed as reforms in these areas are indicated by negative changes in the degree of regulations. All regressions include a constant term. 1. Employment Protection Legislation. 2. Defined as the replacement rate for workers with 66% APW for the first year in unemployment. 3. The big crisis variable was tested for three lagged periods. The reported coefficients summarise the long-run effects. 4. The weighted average (using the relative trade weights) of the dependent variable in the three main trading partners. 5. A summary measure of degree of bargaining centralisation and co-ordination. Source: OECD Secretariat's calculations. O F G O F G O F G O F G O F G O F G O F G O F G 
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Initial structural conditions
Lagged dependent variable (-1)
Macroeconomic conditions
Unemployment rate (-1) . . .
. . .
Macroeconomic policies
Net lending of general government (-1) © OECD 2006 product markets and either no reform or less employment-friendly policies in labour markets. More specifically, estimates suggest that:
• In the overall product market area, market liberalisation in the main trading partners, lower tariff barriers and, for EU countries, the implementation of the Single Market Programme are conducive to domestic reforms, while no clear effect of liberalisation of financial markets was found. These aggregate results are partially confirmed at the industry level:
-The positive effect of combined international influences is most robust in telecommunications. This is not surprising given the increasing importance of efficient communications for trade flows and the emphasis put by the EU on liberalisation in this area.
-The tendency to emulate product market reforms in the main trading partners is strongest in road freight, telecommunications and, to a lesser extent, the electricity sector. Aside from the influence of EU directives, this probably reflects also learning and demonstration effects as well as more intensive cross-border competition than in other non-manufacturing sectors.
-The pro-reform effect of the EU Single Market Programme is found in air transport, road freight, telecommunications, and, to some extent, gas. The missing effect in postal services and the electricity sectors may reflect that EU directives left leeway for implementing liberalisation packages (electricity and post) or that the sector was liberalised earlier (road freight).
• In the overall labour market area, the liberalisation of international trade (measured here by lower tariff barriers) appears to be conducive to more intervention. However, the picture as regards international influences is more complex for specific labour market policies:
-There is some evidence that trade liberalisation generates pressures to make hiring of temporary workers more difficult through stricter EPL for All policy indicators are increasing in restrictions Legend: O: OLS; F: Fixed effect; G: system GMM . = non significant; +/-= significant at 10% level; +/-= significant at 5% level. Note: Negative signs for estimated coefficients indicate positive effects of the variable on implementing the explained reforms. However, for regulatory policy variables (such as trade, finance, product and labour markets) their coefficients should be positively signed as reforms in these areas are indicated by negative changes in the degree of regulations. All regressions include a constant term. 1. The replacement rate after 4/5 years of unemployment relative to the replacement rate for first year unemployed 2. The big crisis variable was tested for three lagged periods. The reported coefficients summarise the long-run effects. 3. The weighted average (using the relative trade weights) of the dependent variable in the three main trading partners. 4. A summary measure of degree of bargaining centralisation and co-ordination. Source: OECD Secretariat's calculations. 
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O F G O F G O F G O F G O F G O F G O F G O F G O F G O F G O F G O F G O F G O F G Initial structural conditions Lagged dependent variable -----------------. . -. . . . -------------. ---.
Macroeconomic conditions
Big economic crisis (-1, -2, -3) 
Interactions with policies in other areas
Public ownership (-1) N um b er of c oun tr ie s 1 9 2 0 1 9 2 1 1 9 2 1 1 9 2 0 1 9 19 1 9 1 9 1 9 2 1 1975-2003 1975-2003 1975-2003 1975-2003 1975-2003 1975-2003 1975-2003 Note: Negative signs for estimated coefficients indicate positive effects of the variable on implementing the explained reforms. However, for regulatory policy variables (such as trade, finance, product and labour markets) their coefficients should be positively signed as reforms in these areas are indicated by negative changes in the degree of regulations. . = non significant; +/-= significant at 10% level; +/-= significant at 5% level. 1. Industry-level product market indicators exclude the public ownership component. 2. The big crisis variable was tested for three lagged periods. The reported coefficients summarise the long-run effects. 3. The weighted average (using the relative trade weights) of the dependent variable in the three main trading partners. 4. Single market dummy interacted with the lagged level of the dependent variable. 5. Public ownership in the considered non-manufacturing sector. 6. A summary measure of degree of bargaining centralisation and co-ordination. Source: OECD Secretariat's calculations. General Specific General Specific General Specific General Specific General Specific General Specific General Specific
Period
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© OECD 2006 this category of contract. At the same time, trade liberalisation is also associated with lesser generosity of unemployment benefits for the longterm unemployed.
-There is also some evidence that countries tend to follow reforms of implicit taxation on continuing work after 60 years implemented in the main trading partners.
29
-Finally, while trade liberalisation is associated with higher tax wedges in OECD member countries, EU membership appears to correlate with lower tax wedges.
To reconcile these results, only conjectures are possible. For instance, redistribution away from the long-term unemployed may reflect the need to reallocate spending to enhance income support schemes that facilitate job-to-job transitions spurred by foreign competition. Tax wedges may also need to be increased to finance this kind of income support.
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Overall, the findings for international influences may reflect two concurrent political economy phenomena in the wake of globalisation. On the one hand, the threat of foreign competition may rally consensus for reforms that make domestic product markets more competitive (and efficient). On the other hand, the feared effects of globalisation on the international division of labour may generate resistance to labour market reforms and consensus for measures that increase workers' protection.
Interactions among different structural policies
Concerning interactions among different structural policies, two main results emerge from the regressions using the aggregate product and labour market policy indicators:
• The lagged indicator of product market regulation has a robust and significant positive effect on the change in the overall indicator of labour market policies. Thus, the idea that product market liberalisation can be a catalyst for subsequent labour market reform is supported by the data. However, at a more detailed policy level, evidence of this is only found in EPL for temporary workers.
• In some regressions, the indicator of public ownership has a significant positive effect on the change in the overall indicator of product market regulation (which is defined net of the public ownership component). However, estimates at the industry level suggest that this has been the case only for air transport and, to a lesser extent, telecommunications. A possible interpretation is that, in these sectors, privatisation policies may have facilitated subsequent liberalisation, perhaps reflecting weaker resistance to liberalisation by stakeholders in privatised firms.
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Looking at interactions between specific or industry-level policy areas the following main results are noteworthy:
• Perhaps surprisingly, only little evidence of interactions among different kinds of labour market policies was found. In this context, one interesting "non-result" is that there is no evidence that easing EPL for temporary workers leads to further reforms in EPL for permanent workers.
32
• In the product market area, there are spill-over effects of reforms from some industries to others. In sectors where the liberalisation process started late, pro-competitive changes tended to be statistically associated with previous reforms in other sectors. In some cases, this may have reflected inter alia intermodal competition from other liberalised industries (e.g. between air and rail transport) and demonstrative and learning effects from regulatory arrangements.
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Macroeconomic policies
Estimates suggest that some macroeconomic policies have an influence on reform efforts, although to a varying degree across policy areas. Almost no effect of fixed exchange rates -neither at the aggregated level nor for individual policieswas found. 34 Fiscal consolidation (the change in the primary surplus) was found to be associated with a slowdown of overall reform, due to its negative correlation with overall labour market reform, but little effects of fiscal consolidation on the individual labour market policies were found. Conversely, little effects of the fiscal position (net lending) were found in aggregate regressions, but significant and robust effects were found in some individual labour market areas. A healthy fiscal position (higher net lending) tends to be associated, on the one hand, with lower tax wedges, lower implicit taxation on continuing work after the age of 55 years and, on the other hand, with more generous benefits for the long-term unemployed.
Political institutions
Results for aggregate labour and product market policy indicators suggest that structural reform are introduced by mature governments (i.e. more than two years old) perhaps reflecting the time needed to overcome political and administrative obstacles. The political orientation of the government was found to have a slowing effect on overall reform intensity in the case of left-of-centre governments. However, little effects of political institutions were found in the individual policy areas. Still, left-of-centre governments tend to increase the relative generosity of unemployment benefits for long-term unemployed, and tend to decrease the implicit tax rate on continuing work after 60 years.
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Demography
Increases in old-age dependency ratios are associated with more overall product market reforms, an effect that is only partially confirmed at the industry level. In the labour market area, a similar pro-reform effect was found for the implicit taxation of continuing work after 55.
Industrial relations
Somewhat surprisingly, no robust evidence was found concerning the effects of bargaining systems and industrial relations (union density and strike activity) on the propensity to implement structural reform.
SUMMARY OF MAIN CONCLUSIONS
The above empirical results identify a number of economic and political factors as having a significant influence on the implementation of structural reform. As already noted, they can be subdivided into factors that are exogenous to the political process and factors that can be influenced by government actions. Focusing on the main results, factors over which governments have little control or that they would not wish to exploit to further structural reform include the occurrence of major economic crises, reform programmes abroad and the duration and the political orientation of government:
• Big economic crises are generally found to be associated with higher overall reform activity, although reforms in certain specific labour market areas (tax wedges, job protection and benefit systems) tend to take place in periods of strong upswings.
• Reforms in trading partners tend to strengthen domestic product market reforms (whereas effects on labour market reforms are more ambiguous).
• Governments in office for some time generally tend to be more able to reform, but left-of-centre governments tend to undertake less reform.
A number of factors that can be influenced by government policies appear to be empirically relevant for the implementation of structural reform:
• A sound government budget balance is associated with higher reform activity, which could reflect an enhanced ability to finance compensatory measures. By contrast, structural improvements of budgets appear to retard structural reform, possibly reflecting the corresponding call on political capital.
• Reform in one policy area sometimes raises the likelihood of subsequent reform in other areas. For example, enhanced trade and investment integration has tended to step up domestic reform in product markets. Moreover, there is evidence of positive spillovers between product market reforms in different © OECD 2006 sectors. As well, domestic product market liberalisation has been associated with subsequent reforms in overall labour market policies (but particularly concerning the hiring of temporary workers).
• In contrast with the generally positive impact of international factors, a reduction of tariff barriers has frequently been associated with a less liberal stance in labour markets.
Notes
1. Manifestation of this can be found in, for example, the EU's Lisbon agenda and the G-7 countries' "Agenda for Growth".
2. These reforms have been documented in various studies. Summaries can be found in OECD (1999, 2001, 2006) . Arguably none of the examined countries (which do not include the transition countries) has ever tried a "big bang" approach to structural reform, probably because of the need for accumulating political and managerial expertise in designing and implementing structural reform. The most quoted examples, the United Kingdom during the Thatcher administration and New Zealand in the 1980s (OECD, 1993 (OECD, , 1996 (OECD, , 2005b IMF, 2004; Card and Freeman, 2001) can in reality better be described as sustained reform efforts over relatively long periods of time. Another prominent example is Australia over the past two decades (OECD, 2005a and the references therein).
3. The coverage of these indicators has been restricted by the need to use quantitative measures with reasonable long time series. In contrast the indicators used in the OECD Job Study have a shorter time span, but a wider coverage, including issues like working time flexibility and activation policies as well as qualitatitive assessments. See also Annex 3 in for a more detailed discussion.
4. Such intrinsic value may relate to notions of fairness (as in protection against arbitrary dismissal), security (as for unemployment insurance) and avoidance of disruption (as in policies to secure the supply of crucial products and services). An additional factor may be loss aversion, such as when benefits of reform objectively are larger than the associated losses, but where the opponents of reform resist much more than pro-reformers because they perceive the losses to be considerably larger.
5. The costs of effective labour market reforms (typically in the form of increased unemployment risk) tend to be born fairly rapidly by job holders and the benefits (in the form of higher employment probability) tend to materialise later, leading Coe and Snower (1997) to conclude that the main determinants of resistance to reform are their distributional and timing effects. Indeed, labour market reforms have often focused on job search measures that have little effect on wage bargaining positions of incumbent workers (Elmeskov et al., 1998) .
6. According to the private interest theory of regulation (Stigler, 1971; Peltzman, 1976) , rent-seeking private agents try to appropriate these rents by shaping, twisting or preserving regulation and by controlling or lobbying the political process of forming regulation. Examples are favourable employment conditions in public-owned monopolies, self-regulation of entry in professional services, or situations in which special interest groups often manage to capture the regulatory process so as to increase rents (e.g. taxi licenses).
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7. These conditions are also determined by factors that are beyond the control of governments, such as legal origins and cultural characteristics.
8. This hypothesised relationship between crisis and structural reform contains two elements. One is that reform is more likely to be adopted during recessions than during economic upswings. The other is that the situation has to become very serious to induce reforms (Drazen, 2000) . This line of thinking is supported by a number of wellknown cases, such as the United Kingdom at the end of the 1970s, and the Netherlands and New Zealand in the 1980s (IMF, 2004) . Similar patterns are also found outside the OECD area, such as in the Latin American countries in the early 1980s.
9. Saint-Paul (2000) argues that the resistance to reform is largest at the end of an economic recession.
10. Pitlik and Wirth (2003) found a U-shaped relation between reform intensity and growth crisis, where no or deep crisis would tend to trigger high reform intensity, but reform efforts are at their weakest in connection with medium crisis levels.
11. In cases where the thresholds of the Stability and Growth Pact have been binding, there was little scope for using fiscal policy as part of a two-handed approach combing macroeconomic and structural policies (Bean, 1998) . However, in the revised Stability and Growth Pact the enforcement of sanctions takes into account reform efforts. Beetsma and Ribeiro (2005) argue that in connection with structural reform, there is a trade-off between reducing electoral uncertainty by providing costly compensation and maintaining the budget deficit limits stipulated in the pact.
12. Another, more long-term, effect would arise if a currency union leads to greater regional specialisation. In this context, asymmetric shocks have a larger regional effect and would lead to greater variation in labour demand, which could lead to greater demands for protection against unemployment risks, thus increasing opposition to reform. On the other hand, the reverse argument is that a greater likelihood of asymmetric shocks strengthens the TINA argument. It should be noted, though, that so far there is little indication that the EMU has induced such a specialisation effect.
13. In product markets, several institutional factors may amplify the "voice" of interest groups that try to capture the political decision process, such as when industry representatives participate in regulatory decisions like zoning regulation (Boylaud, 2000) or self-regulation in professional services. Such factors may be further strengthened by direct links of some firms with the political sphere (Faccio, 2003 ). An additional institutional factor favouring regulatory status quo is when heavy administrative procedures increase the leverage power of bureaucrats (Djankov et al., 2002) .
14. Other political factors that may hinder the implementation of structural reform are political fragmentation (the number of political parties represented in parliament) and ideological polarisation, which tend to exacerbate conflicts of interest, hindering the formation of stable pro-reform coalitions.
15. An additional effect from financial market liberalisation is the stronger incentive for implementing domestic reforms that attract foreign capital. Moreover, such liberalisation also stimulates demand and hence allows an easier and quicker "crowding-in" of other reforms likely to boost growth (Saint-Paul and Bentolila, 2000; Saint-Paul, 2002) .
16. The degree of openness may be particularly important for the regulatory set-up in smaller countries, which typically need to adjust more quickly their regulatory framework in reaction to external shocks to restore competitiveness (for example because of greater industry specialisation and a faster materialisation of negative effects). How-
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© OECD 2006 ever, empirical evidence of such a small country effect has been limited so far. An additional issue is that small open economies may tend to pursue policies with a high degree of social insurance and strong automatic stabilisers (Rodrik, 1998) .
17. The undermining of natural monopolies in itself implies that in political economy terms there is a reduced demand for reform -at least insofar as existing regulation does not hamper the process of structural change. Moreover, faced with new technological developments, incumbents themselves may rally the pro-reform side, as observed for instance in Europe, where dominant telecom operators pushed for corporatisation and privatisation over the 1990s. It should also be noted, that competitive markets tend to adopt new technologies faster, implying a reversed causality as compared with new technology as a political economy factor.
18. ICT also improved management of transmission and wholesale markets in the electricity sector, which also saw the introduction of small-scale combined gas turbine generators that lowered entry barriers and sunk costs in the sector (Steiner, 2000) . In addition, in air transport ICT improved air traffic control, reservation systems and ticket management, making room for new entrants.
19. A countervailing effect to this general increase in labour demand is if the rent sharing between firms and workers had taken place through over-manning, then a labour shake up could take place in certain sectors in the short run. Empirical results suggest, however, that this effect is minor and, at least over the medium term, employment gains are to be expected (Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2005; Bassanini and Duval, 2006) . 20. Another political economy rationale for the link between public ownership and barriers to entry is that politicians (especially in countries with large budget deficits) may be more inclined to maintain profitable state monopolies to collect explicit and implicit (monopoly rents) taxes (Li et al., 2001) .
21. In addition to compensation, packaging may have the advantage from a political economy point of view that specific interest groups may find it more difficult to block individual measures in the package due to resistance from other interest groups that would be advantaged by these measures (Bean, 1998) .
22. Explaining reform patterns within a political economy framework is a relatively recent development. The present investigation expands on existing work by IMF (2004) and Duval and Elmeskov (2005) by using a linear specification of both aggregate and specific structural policies, which allows for a more detailed investigation of the links between such policies and political economy factors.
23. Interestingly, recent work by Duval (2005) confirms the results in Duval and Elmeskov (2005) using a linear specification.
24. The use of lags is also a (rough) way to account for the potential endogeneity of policies.
25. This test is based on the property that, if the error terms in levels are serially independent, the first-difference of errors in the system GMM will exhibit first but not second order serial correlation.
26. However, particularly in the general specification, where the set of explanatory variables is rather large, the power of this test in identifying invalid restrictions falls dramatically.
27. As expected, System-GMM estimates of the coefficient of the lagged level of the dependent variable, α, fall between OLS and fixed effect estimates in almost all regres-© OECD 2006 sions, with the exception of some unemployment benefit regressions in the labour market and some of the industry-level regressions in the product market. 28. However, an echo of these policies can be found in the tendency for unusually high unemployment rates to slow down the rate of convergence of implicit tax rates to the OECD mean. 29. Perhaps this partly reflects extensive international benchmarking of the sustainability of pension systems in the OECD area. 30. Alternatively, this could be a statistical artefact driven by the fact that tax wedges have been relatively high in EU countries where tariff barriers are uniformly low. The tax wedges used in this work do not include indirect taxes, implying that the result that EU membership correlates with lower tax wedges may just reflect a re-balancing of taxes towards indirect taxes among EU members. 31. This prior privatisation may be helpful for the successful liberalisation of sectors with fewer natural monopoly elements, in which increasing the pressure of potential new entrants by establishing a level-playing field is crucial. Also, workers' resistance to liberalisation in these largely competitive sectors may be easier to curb when the incumbent is already subject to private company law and industrial relations (see Box 3). 32. If anything, the results suggest that policy changes that make EPL for permanent workers more stringent are followed by similar changes in EPL for temporary workers. 33. The lack of spill-over effects for air transport and road freight may reflect that these sectors were among the first to be liberalised. 34. The contrast to the findings by Duval and Elmeskov (2005) may reflect their focus on the occurrence of major reforms in a somewhat different subset of policy areas.
